Based on the analysis of the characteristics of micro grid, we established a micro grid power market with the multi-agent theory to mode the interaction between micro grid and large grid. Then the Nash game theory was used to analyze the bidding strategy of micro grid considering a power market with imperfect competition. We found that the bidding strategy with high proportion factor and low cost quotation of micro grid can maximize the system's profit. Although the change of any micro grid's bidding strategy will lead to the adjustment of bidding strategy of other micro grids, the system will eventually achieve Nash equilibrium. Finally, we obtained the optimal bidding strategy and selection scheme of micro grid to maximize the micro grid's profit through numerical analysis.
Introduction
Smart grid is considered as the next-generation power network. Its most important aim is to improve the energy efficiency, quality and reliability of the power system. It is also the inevitable result of the innovation and sustainable development of distributed generation and energy storage, advanced power electronics and modern communication technologies [1] . In order to efficiently and reliably manage and operate such an important and complex architecture, the micro grid (MG), as the most important component of smart grid, can integrate and coordinate the distributed MG through the distributed energy resource management platform.
Distributed generation (DG) is that the power generation facilities placed directly in the distribution network or distributed near the load, generating electricity economically, efficiently and reliably [2] . Power generation facilities in the distributed generation system are called as distributed power sources including wind power generation, solar power generation, fuel cells, and micro gas turbines, et al. These power supplies usually have a small power generation (typically less than 50 MW) and are close to the user. They can generally supply power directly to nearby loads or output power to the grid as needed. This is called as distributed energy resources(DER) [3] . The efficient introduction of MG faces numerous challenges on many fronts such as design, control, and implementation [4] . Although many programs have been made in the MG generation technology, electricity trades among MGs have received limited attention [5] . In recent years, smart grid pricing related to electricity trades has always been a very important topic. In this field, some researches focused on demand-side management [6] [7] [8] . Also, some research studied the pricing mechanism of power market with different bidding models [9] [10] [11] .
Consider the rapid development of MG technology, microeconomic analysis on power pricing considering a finite number of agents in the power market is important for the success of MG. In this paper, we construct a multi-agent system based power trading market with micro-grid, and investigate the optimal bidding strategy for micro grid with Nash game theory. At the same time, we exploit the bidding mechanism and income according to the market clearing bidding principle.
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MG Bidding Model
We considers a multi-agent MG system that is connected by a large number of power electronic devices such as wind power, small hydropower, solar photovoltaic power generation, gas turbines and other distributed power sources. Suppose that there are n MGs in the electricity market to sell electricity, and one of the specific MGs (hereinafter referred to as MG 0) is used as the entry point, and the power generation cost is
(1) where 0 () W  is the power generation cost for MG0, 0  is output of MG0, c is fixed cost of MG0 power generation, and a and b are the secondary and primary cost constant coefficients of the output, respectively. The output of MG 0 is the production cost of MG 0. Considering the market uncertainty, these MG sales entities will increase their own costs according to the changes in the market. In other words, the MG sales subject is in a free market competition environment. According to economic principles, these power sales entities will increase the proportion based on the original cost when participating in the sale of electricity: When the market demand is greater than the supply, a scale factor  ( 1   )is added to the cost. When the market demand is less than the supply, a scale factor  ( 1   ) is added, and the optimal profit is dynamically adjusted on the basis of considering its own profit., then the cost function of MG 0 is 0 () WW   (2) Additionally, there are 1 n  MGs participating in bidding for electricity sales. Similar to the hypothesis of MG0, the cost function of the i ( 1 
 is cost-addition dynamic adjustment factor for MG i , and i  is the output of MG i . It can be seen that the profit of MG0 is formed as
Since MG0 is difficult to know the power generation cost information of other 1 n  MG bidding power sales entities, MG0 can only predict the probability distribution of power generation cost of these competitors through historical information, so other methods can be calculated by probability theory method.
It is assumed that MG i has i h different types corresponding to different power generation cost functions. Similarly, the cost dynamic adjustment factor also has i r different types, which also correspond to different probabilities, and the power generation cost and the cost addition dynamic adjustment factor. The mutual distribution is independent, then the probability distribution of the power generation cost W of the MG and the probability distribution of the cost-addition dynamic adjustment factor i  are 
According to the ideas discussed above, there is also a cost dynamic adjustment factor for the expected cost of the MG i , which is set to i  , Therefore, the expected cost addition function of the
At this point, the bidding game between MGs is obviously complete information, so it can be solved by Nash equilibrium. Using the first derivative, the corresponding results are obtained as in Eq.(10) and Eq.(11), and it is easy to judge that the second derivative is less than zero.
According to the demand forecast, the MG trading center can get the power load at this time, and then determine the total output of all bidding MG as follows:
 is the amount of electricity purchased by the grid trading center to the external large grid.
By combining (10), (11), (12) into a set of equations, the optimal bidding capacity of MG0 can be obtained with consideration of competitors' conditions. 11 (2), we can get the expected value of marginal cost of MG0.
(14) By combining (3), (5), (8) into a set of equations, it is possible to estimate that competitors of the MG 0 expect to bid for electricity.
(15) With the same reason (11) , it can be estimated that the expected price of the MG 0 competitor is (2 ) 
Obviously, the expected price between MG 0 and its competitors is generally different, but the price in the electricity market is unique. According to the principle of unified clearing price, the bidding price of all MG participants is ranked from low to high, and the highest bidding price is the final clearing price of the power market. Therefore, the clearing price of the market is 1 1 max( , , , )
, Combining equations (4) and (9), we can get the expected profits of each MG after bidding.
Comparative Analysis
Analysis of Optimal Bidding Strategy for MG
Aiming at the general research methods of MG, the general law of MG bidding is obtained by modeling and simulation. Referring to the existing literature [12] and considering the particularity of this problem, this paper designs the relevant data of MG bidding, and analyzes the bidding strategy of MG through numerical simulation. This paper assumes that there are 3 MG agents in the power trading market, which are specific MG 0, MG 1 and MG 2 participating in the bidding. There are three cost types for each MG, namely high cost strategy (H), medium cost strategy (M) and low cost strategy (L), Taking into account the cost of the MG itself and market changes, as well as the dynamic adjustment of bidding, the relevant data are obtained, as shown in Table 1 . Taking the specific MG 0 as a reference object, it needs to estimate the data of competitors(agent of MG1 and MG2) . Without loss of generality, in order to study the strategies of the three agents, the cost dynamic adjustment factors are taken as 0.8, 1.0 and 1.2 respectively. Table 3 gives the probability distributions of three different cost dynamic adjustment factors.
The predicted bidding cost parameters of MG1 and MG2 can be calculated by combining the formulas (7) and (8) in Table 2 (see Table 3 ). In order to improve the accuracy of the prediction of a specific MG0, this paper gives a certain dynamic adjustment coefficient i  of the estimated parameters based on Table 4 . This value needs to be valued according to the specific situation of the electricity market, and the value is generally A game model is used to calculate the optimal bidding strategy and output of MG, and its value is shown in Table 4 . The " LL" in Table 5 represents a combination of low cost dynamic adjustment factors and low bidding for MG 0. The rest of the combinations can be analogized by cost dynamic adjustment factors and bidding types. As can be seen from table 4, some data do not reach the minimum value of MG output. For example, in the case of LH, LM and LL, the optimal output of MG 2 is less than the minimum output. Therefore, it is necessary to arrange output according to the minimum output. The MG power trading center provides electricity to the transmission network by the ordering of quotations. If the minimum output is not reached, it is delivered to the grid according to the minimum output arrangement, and then the relevant data is calculated using the model, and finally the actual output and quotation of each MG are obtained.
On this basis, the bidding price of each MG is ranked from low to high, and the low price is given priority to access the grid. For example, in HM portfolio, the bidding relationship is MG0 (quoted 50.14$/MW) < MG2 (quoted 51.49$/MW) < MG1 (quoted 57.65$/MW). Therefore, the priority of MG0 is 47.14MW, and then MG2 is 90.05MW. The remaining demand is 39.33MW, which is provided by MG1. The market clearing price is determined according to the maximum quotation in the three MGs. In this case, there will be two cases: (1) the actual output of three MGs cann't meet the load, MG power trading center need to purchase the shortage of electricity from the distribution network; (2) If the sum of the minimum outputs of the individual MGs is still greater than the load, it is necessary to provide surplus power to the outside. According to the actual output of each MG and the market clearing price, the cost and profit can be obtained respectively, as shown in Table 5 . According to the same analysis steps in case 1, the optimal bidding strategies for each MG and their benefits are obtained as shown in tables 6 and 7. At this time, if the MG 0 put a bid in according to " HL" combination, the bidding price is 50.79$/MW, and the bidding power is 44.61MW. Under this circumstance, the bidding strategy is the same as the above strategy, but they have not the similar bidding price and output. This shows that the MG can influence the market price through its own bidding strategy, and then obtain excess profits. According to above-mentioned analytical result and MG 0 uses HL's bidding strategy to maximize its own profits. Similarly, his competitors will arrange bidding based on this principle. When the bidding strategy of a certain entity participating in the bidding is adjusted, its competitors will adjust their bidding strategies accordingly to ensure the optimization of their own returns, the game that is called Nash equilibrium, will eventually form a equilibrium point. Under this equilibrium condition, participants in bidding are unwilling to change their bidding strategies.
Case 3 In this case, using the data in tables 8 and 9 and Nash game model, the bidding price and the corresponding power output can be obtained, as shown in table 6.
According to the quotation given in Table 8 , the MG power market trading center draws up the power grid operation plan at this moment according to the actual situation. Similar to the previous situation, the market clearing price can be obtained by sorting the power grid operation plan according to the principle that the bidder with the lowest quotation gives priority to the power grid. Combining with the power generation limitation of three MGs, the generation cost and optimal profit of each MG can be obtained by using the clearing price of the electricity market, as shown in Table 9 . In this case, according to the same calculation method as before, we can get the bidding quantity and quotation of three MGs (see Table 10 ). Similarly, the MG power market trading center will formulate the power operation plan at this time according to the quotation of each MG, and then order the power grid from low to high according to the quotation, so as to obtain the market clearing 92 price. According to the clearing price, the optimal profit of MG 0 under different combinations will be calculated. As can be seen from Table 11 , in the case of high load P =186.6MW, the bidding strategy will not change if the MG wants to get the maximum profit, but the bidding, bidding capacity and final profit will change. According to Table 12 , it can be seen that MG 0 bids according to the HL combination strategy, and the maximum profit is 1707.78$. At this time, the electricity market clearing price is 59.56$/MW, and MG 0 obtains the grid power of 65.15 MW. 
Conclusion
In view of the situation that multiple MGs participate in bidding power generation in the electricity market trading center, this paper discusses the advantages of multi-agent application in MG bidding system, and proposes a power market bidding system structure that reflects distributed characteristics. Using the superior agent profit maximization strategy and the MG internal cost minimization strategy, while fully considering the MG characteristics, the MG profit maximization energy scheduling strategy is achieved. The profit maximization bidding strategy of MG agent and the cost optimization strategy of MG agent are proposed. In the example, the special characteristics of the MG are fully considered, so that it can maximize profits while maintain full utilization of natural energy. Finally, the optimal bidding strategy and the optimal scheme for the profit maximization of MG are obtained by numerical analysis, which provides a theoretical basis for MG to obtain higher profits on the basis of considering other competitors.
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